Is GMAB a Buy or a Sell? The Bull and Bear Case (2026)

That depends on which case you find more convincing, and both are on this page. The bull case rests on DARZALEX royalties still compounding, with revenue (ttm) at ~$4.1 billion, presented in US dollars (H1 2026 was ~$2.05 billion, up ~25% year over year). The bear case rests on revenue concentration is the first-order risk: DARZALEX royalties were roughly 64% of first-half 2026 revenue, Genmab does not control how the drug is priced or promoted, and daratumumab exclusivity does not last forever, so the whole equity story is a race between pipeline conversion and eventual biosimilar erosion. Analysts covering it are spread from $32.00 to $43.20, which is itself a signal that this is genuinely contested. If you believe the thesis, the real questions become sizing and overlap rather than timing. Walnut is not an investment adviser and this is not a recommendation.

Nobody can answer that for you, and the honest version of the question is narrower: has anything changed in the reason you bought it? The bear case on this page is the place to check. Revenue concentration is the first-order risk: DARZALEX royalties were roughly 64% of first-half 2026 revenue, Genmab does not control how the drug is priced or promoted, and daratumumab exclusivity does not last forever, so the whole equity story is a race between pipeline conversion and eventual biosimilar erosion. If that risk is what you were worried about and it is now playing out, that is a real signal. If the price simply fell while the thesis held, that is a different situation entirely. The most pessimistic published target is $32.00, +0.2% from the $31.94 price, which is one analyst's downside case rather than a floor. Walnut is not an investment adviser.

DARZALEX royalties still compounding. Daratumumab keeps taking share in multiple myeloma, moving earlier into treatment lines and into subcutaneous dosing, and worldwide net trade sales reached about $4.21 billion in the second quarter of 2026. The most optimistic analyst target on GMAB is $43.20, +35.3% from the $31.94 price. That figure is only reachable if this thesis works close to its best case.

Revenue concentration is the first-order risk: DARZALEX royalties were roughly 64% of first-half 2026 revenue, Genmab does not control how the drug is priced or promoted, and daratumumab exclusivity does not last forever, so the whole equity story is a race between pipeline conversion and eventual biosimilar erosion. Multiple myeloma is also the most crowded field in oncology, with Sanofi's Sarclisa, Pfizer's Elrexfio, and Johnson & Johnson's own TECVAYLI, TALVEY, and CARVYKTI all competing for the same patients that daratumumab treats. EPKINLY faces Roche's Lunsumio and Columvi and Regeneron's odronextamab in lymphoma, and Rina-S enters an ovarian setting where AbbVie's Elahere is already established. The wholly owned pipeline concentrates outcome risk in a small number of readouts, and the Merus deal spent a large share of the balance sheet on one of them. AbbVie has also filed a trade secret misappropriation complaint in US federal court touching antibody-drug conjugate technology, which is separate from ordinary commercial risk. Finally, the ADS carries Danish krone exposure and the ordinary share's Copenhagen listing sets the price the ADS tracks. The most pessimistic published target is $32.00, +0.2% from the current price, which is roughly what the stock is worth if these risks bite rather than the drivers.

Copenhagen antibody developer funded by DARZALEX royalties, now building wholly owned oncology products such as EPKINLY and Rina-S.

Decide that in advance, because it is far harder to think clearly once a position is moving against you. The concrete tripwires here: the driver behind the bull case (DARZALEX royalties still compounding) stalling in the reported numbers rather than in the narrative, the risk above (revenue concentration is the first-order risk: DARZALEX royalties were roughly 64% of first-half 2026 revenue, Genmab does not control how the drug is priced or promoted, and daratumumab exclusivity does not last forever, so the whole equity story is a race between pipeline conversion and eventual biosimilar erosion) turning from a possibility into a reported fact, or the position growing large enough that a bad outcome would matter to your whole portfolio regardless of who is right.

That depends on your goals, time horizon, and risk tolerance, and this is not investment advice. The case for it is a profitable royalty engine growing about 20%, raised 2026 guidance, EPKINLY sales up about 48%, and two wholly owned late-stage assets in Rina-S and petosemtamab. The case against it is that roughly 64% of first-half revenue came from royalties on a drug Genmab does not sell, exclusivity on that drug is finite, and the $8 billion Merus deal concentrated a lot of the balance sheet behind a small number of clinical readouts.

It designs therapeutic antibodies, mostly for cancer, using its own platforms such as DuoBody for bispecifics and HexaBody for enhanced antibody activity. Historically it licensed those antibodies to larger pharmaceutical companies and collected royalties, which is how DARZALEX ended up being sold by Johnson & Johnson. More recently it has been building products it owns and commercializes itself, which is the strategic shift the Merus acquisition was meant to accelerate.

Genmab's ordinary shares trade in Copenhagen in Danish kroner, and US investors typically buy the American Depositary Shares listed on Nasdaq under GMAB. The ADR program's ratio is ten ADSs to one ordinary share, so an ADS represents a tenth of the Copenhagen-listed share and trades at roughly a tenth of its price. Because that ratio was changed, per-ADS prices from earlier periods are not directly comparable to today's without adjustment. Confirm the current ratio with your broker or the company's ADR program page before doing per-share math.